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Underground Asia: Global Revolutionaries and the Assault on Empire,

by Tim Harper

Harper offers an excellent work that draws on his great understanding of South-East Asian history and provides an arresting account of a strand in imperial history.

Whereas his co-written *Forgotten Armies* and *Forgotten Wars* were each somewhat weak as military history, this new book superbly captures its topic, ranging widely to consider anti-imperial history and also to link it into the wider geopolitical and ideological themes of the period, including nationalism, great-power competition and the impact of Communism.

The tales of particular careers and episodes, for example the Singapore rising of 1915, are well-handled. So also are imperial concerns about assassination. There is also a good handling of racism, although I would have preferred much more on imaginative literature. Thus, *Fu Manchu* receives far too little attention, and, more generally, it would have been useful to know much more about racist imagery in publications and across a range of mediums. That, indeed, would be a worthwhile follow-up project.

This is also necessary because the central problem of all such studies, one that Harper understands and ably probes, is how to move from an assemblage of particular networks of rebellion to grasp wider questions of the stability of empire. Here it would have been useful to look at other sources.

For example, as also in his earlier work, there is much more to be said about the military dimension. Here again, it is necessary to cite with caution. Thus at the time of the Chanak Crisis in 1922, which is of relevance to this book even though in South-West Asia, Lord Rawlinson, Commander-in-Chief India, warned about the danger of conflict spreading across the Islamic world: "To undertake offensive action

against the Turk is merely to consolidate a Pan-Islamic movement," a threat that also concerned the General Staff in London.

So, empire at risk; but, in practice, read across the breadth of military correspondence, the overall emphasis is less on insurrection than on external threats. And so also for France, which in the 1920s faced rebellions, including in Syria and Vietnam, but was primarily concerned about Italian volatility under Mussolini and the danger of Italian-Spanish co-operation. Harper might well disagree, and there is room for a debate, but it is disappointing not to see such a discussion given real prominence in this excellent work. Contextualisation in my view trumps unilinear approaches, let alone "thick history" however widely the latter is defined.

I agree entirely that the "Cold War" should have a longer duration, and, indeed, argued this in my book on the subject. In practice it began with the Russian Civil War, but Harper skillfully interleaves it with a number of passages to radicalism, including communism, "Islamism" and Sikh militancy, although more attention could also have been devoted to the respective "internationals" of religious thought and practice. More generally, the international dimensions of a subject, too often treated in terms of national narratives, emerge very well in Harper's study, but some of the judgments could do with qualification. Thus, "the colonialism of the 1930s was shot through with nostalgia," is only true to a point as such an assessment underplays development strategies.

Also, of the remote Dutch detention camp at malarial Boven Digoel in New Guinea: "in colonial Asia in the 1930s such places multiplied, a premonition of the new camps that were opening in Europe"; actually no, not at all like the Soviet *gulags* or the Nazi regimen. Take, for example, the Cellular Jail built by Britain between 1896 and 1906 at Port Blair on South Andaman Island for political detainees deported from mainland India. In 1921, following

revelations of brutality by prison guards, it was decided to end the transportation of prisoners to Port Blair and to repatriate the political prisoners to mainland Indian jails. However, in turn, overcrowding in mainland jails resulted in a revival of the transportation of non-political prisoners, while political violence in India led to the dispatch of political detainees to the jail. This was contentious, notably because of hunger strikes in 1933 and 1937 against conditions there. As a result of this controversy, political prisoners were returned to mainland India.

In the Cellular Jail, as now presented to visitors, the harsh nature of the prison regime, and thus allegedly of imperial rule by Britain, is demonstrated by both commission and omission. There is a presentation of single cells and the consequent night-time solitary confinement as abuses designed to break the spirit of prisoners, and not an explanation that these were then advanced practice and likely to lessen the serious risks of the spread of infection.

The routine, and sometimes deadly, abuse of prisoners in shared cells by other inmates is itself a serious problem in modern India (and elsewhere), although the well-connected do not tend to go to prison or, indeed, face the risk of conviction. Far from being a matter simply of colonial control, moreover, the Cellular Jail was constructed on lines similar to Pentonville prison in London, which had been opened in 1842, and was considered state-of-the-art, as it indeed was.

Present-day information for visitors to the Cellular Jail praises the hunger strikers as courting “martyrdom,” refers to “brutal and sadistic torture,” and describes the work that detainees did as “soul shattering” and “intended to function as a form of torture.” This approach scarcely captures the extent to which such work was fairly typical for prison regimes, and in both domestic and imperial contexts. There is a life-size model of a prisoner being flogged, as well as the remains of the gallows. Displays provide highly emotive comments:

Living hell ... today a sacred place ... the everlasting flame for achieving freedom ... holy fire in memory of freedom fighters who died here ... so that future generations could know about the revolutionary freedom movement and appreciate the tremendous cost at which our independence was achieved.

These iniquities were driven home for those who could not travel to Port Blair in a 1996 film by Priyadarshan, a film entitled *Kaalapani* in Malayalam and *Siraichalai* in Tamil. Expounding through history the value of independence, the jail now serves as an account both of a valiant struggle for freedom and of the harshness of imperial rule, the latter apparently demonstrating the need for this freedom.

The imperial perspective, understandably, is absent. That some of the cases for which prisoners were imprisoned at Port Blair, for example the Lahore Conspiracy case of 1915, occurred when Britain was involved in World War One, in which many Indian volunteers fought for the empire, is not brought out. Nor is the point that the murderers of judges generally are not treated as heroes.

Moreover, other Indian perspectives are not considered at the jail. In practice, indeed, Indians disagree about the unity and heroic status of the prisoners. For example, the shock created for the prisoners by losing caste in being sent to prison meant more to some Indians than others and is not mentioned in the jail. Caste rifts between patriots are not part of the narrative. There was also a tension, again not mentioned, between the prisoners’ stance in the 1930s and that of the non-violent opposition to British rule associated with Gandhi. A fascinating book, and a useful angle on empire, but incomplete, albeit necessarily so.

Underground Asia. Global Revolutionaries and the Assault on Empire, by Tim Harper. London: Penguin, 2020 / Cambridge, Ma.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2021. Pp. xxx, 800+. Illus., maps, notes, biblio, index. \$39.95, ISBN 978-0-6747-2461-7; e- and paperback editions. --Prof. Jeremy Black.

Originally published in *The Critic*, November 2020, this review appears by the kind permission of Prof. Black and *The Critic*.

Mortal Republic:
How Rome Fell into Tyranny,
 by Edward J. Watts

Mortal Republic traces the key events in the period leading to the downfall of the Roman Republic, which eventually culminated in a series of violent civil wars and the emergence of Octavian Augustus as the first emperor. Prof. Watt covers an enormous amount of history at a very brisk pace and as such offers a more thematic and cursory approach than a detailed and trenchant analysis of the period.

Mortal Republic opens in 280 B.C. with Pyrrhus, the king of Epirus, facing off against Rome in Southern Italy. At that time, Rome was a regional power with an agriculture-based economy and a political system effectively run by a hereditary aristocracy, though not without some checks and balances. Two Consuls were elected for a period of one year and held veto power over each other’s votes, while plebeians were also able to hold office. During this stage of the Republic, men such as the wise Appius Claudius and the poor but noble Gaius Fabricius harkened back to the legend of Cincinnatus.

With its victory in the Second Punic War over Carthage in 201 B.C., however, Rome emerged as the dominant power in the Mediterranean. The infrastructure Rome built to defeat Hannibal was staggering in its scale and commitment. (At one point in the Second Punic War 70-percent of the male citizens aged 17-60 were enrolled in the military.)

As the spoils of war and tribute flowed increasingly into the city's coffers, the emphasis on honor and virtue as critical for political advancement gave way to amassing wealth in order to pursue higher office. Additionally, this influx of wealth led to a growing inequality and restlessness. As some politicians courted the populist base with promises of land reform, most struggled to maintain the status quo. *Mortal Republic* provides ample evidence that this social tension led to political violence and upheaval. Not only were the Gracchii brothers, aristocratic members of the *Populares*, murdered but over 3,000 of their followers as well. While the Republic was dealing with these tensions at home, the rest of Italy, Greece, and most of Asia Minor revolted. Eventually these twin dynamics led to Sulla leading the Roman army within the city's walls to slaughter his opponents, which set the stage for the first Triumvirate, of Crassus, Caesar, and Pompey the Great. After the death of Crassus, Caesar defeated Pompey at Pharsalus and became de-facto emperor in all but name. Watts does a thorough job of connecting these social, economic and political events even if the linkage is more nuanced and complex than *Mortal Republic* suggests.

After Caesar's assassination, Augustus, his posthumously adopted son, emerged as Rome's savior and crowned himself emperor. Ruthless and talented, with his sole purpose being to survive, Augustus promised security and safety to the people and the return of the Republican political offices to the patricians. While the trappings of the Republic were maintained, its institutions, "which channeled the individual energies of Romans in ways that benefited the entire Roman commonwealth", were confined to nostalgia. Although Professor Watts clearly views Augustus as a repugnant figure, he acknowledges his genius and the fact that he most likely saved Rome from further violence. (Warning: Cicero isn't portrayed in a very favorable light either.)

The author alludes to the fate of the Roman Republic as a harbinger for the current state of American politics. (The book was published in 2018 so the allusion is clear.) However, one would not be wrong to conclude that it wasn't so much Rome's leaders which failed it but the inability of its institutions to support and adapt to Rome's growing empire and the social instability

it introduced. There are better introductions to the key events and personalities in this period, but *Mortal Republic* offers the layman a solid summary of the political and social forces at work.

Mortal Republic: How Rome Fell into Tyranny, by Edward J. Watts. New York: Basic Books /Perseus, 2018. Pp. xii, 352. Maps, notes, index. \$17.99 paper, ISBN 978-1-5416-4648-3; e-editions. -- Gregory McNiff

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A Short History of War, by Jeremy Black

Odds are that sometime, somewhere, any serious student of military matters has picked up a book by Professor Black, likely the most prolific historical writer in English, who can boast over a hundred volumes bearing his name.

This work is one of his latest. (Although, apparently, it is not one of his most original. In 2010, he published the 192-page *War: A Short History*, which sounds rather similar.) In this compact, revisited text, the author nevertheless applies his undeniable erudition to a rapid survey of human bellicosity from the Stone Age to around the end of 2020.

(Sigh. If he had only waited a bit longer to publish, he would have had reams of fresh material...although he *does* present an astute speculation on the future of conflict, which he believes will be increasingly urbanized.)

Black arranges his consolidation of warfare into 40 – of necessity, brief – chapters. He sets a fierce pace, which he can only sustain by jettisoning footnotes, maps, tables, charts, appendices, or any graphics at all. There is, however, an index at the end, along with a rudimentary bibliography.

Dates and empires and battles and leaders whiz by as fast as skipped stations on a downtown express. The need for compression certainly explains why the Roman Republic and Empire go up and down in about 12 pages, as well as why such a learned scholar makes an occasional howler.

This one, referring to the Battle of Gaugamela in 331 B.C.E., rankled me because I'd just finished a book on ancient warfare: "Alexander's force was seven thousand strong, and the Persian forty thousand..." (p. 32) Excuse me, Jeremy, but most historians concur that the Macedonian had about forty to forty-seven thousand; Darius' numbers were apparently hazier, but many sources suggest multiples of his opponent's.

Okay, no point in excessive nitpicking on figures, given the vast span of time and subjects the writer covers.

Read On. Gradually, however, his writing gets smoother, and his analysis sharpens during the chronological march of chapters, especially after the introduction of gunpowder and advancing weapons technology. By the eighteenth century – one of Black’s comfort zones – common-sense assertions are much more frequently outnumbered by keen insights.

For instance, I quickly nodded in agreement when he emphasizes that the developing range of new technologies -- beyond that of weaponry alone -- greatly influenced the application of nineteenth-century warfare.

Among broader examples of industrial progress, the writer identifies those enhancing military prowess:

- (a) faster, more reliable transportation, supplied by trains and steamships;
- (b) better victualling, thanks to canned meat and powdered milk; and
- (c) communication advances, like the telegraph.

All of these, of course, helped Europeans expand their power during their famous age of imperialism. Yet, the author perceptively notes that non-Westerners *also* displayed nasty imperialistic urges during this period. Professor Black underlines this underappreciated fact:

“The list of expanding powers in the nineteenth century included, in Africa, Egypt, Lunda, Abyssinia, Sudan under the Mahdi, and the Zulus . . . In Asia, China was still able to intervene effectively in Nepal in 1792, and the list of expanding states there would include Burma, Punjab under the Sikhs, Siam (Thailand), and Japan.” (p. 173)

As can be seen from the former paragraph, Professor Black does not ignore other cultures’ modes of conflict. Twelve of his 30 chapters prior to World War I review the military histories of China, Japan, India, Persia, Arabia, Egypt, and Africa, as well as those of Native American, Mongolian, and Australasian/Oceanic societies.

Military-History Pundits. In his excellent penultimate chapter, “Theorists of Military History,” the author identifies several of the problems he finds with such authorities, one of which is the dominance of the European experience – a reality that occupies disproportionate space and distorts analysis. “The sense here,” he concludes, “is that it is non-Western military that requires more attention.” (p. 241)

Black believes that the standard theoretical approach overfocuses on traditional Western “great commanders, on major wars, and on supposedly decisive battles” -- many of which

might be regarded differently by military savants based in Beijing, Delhi, Lagos, or Lima.

Another criticism he offers is that “many of the same old thinkers” get trotted out, often with “a repetition of past arguments and established problems.” (Clausewitz, Jomini, Hart, Fuller, Corbett, *et. al.*, -- he’s looking at you, guys.)

Black adds that the spotlight on struggles between (or among) states is too bright, while it is rather dim on conflicts *within* them, which diminishes attention to revolutions and civil wars. Moreover, conventional battles are frequently stressed, while other subjects tend to be sorely neglected: *e.g.*, sieges, blockades, raids, culture, and the influences of social changes and religious ideologies.

In addition, Professor Black is quite insightful about the poor treatment most theorists give to some of the world’s most successful militaries – that is, those of the steppes, like the Huns and Mongols.

Too often, he finds, their evaluations become teleology; in other words, “we know where we are going, and it is both inevitable and good.” That is based on the foregone conclusion that these horseback warriors will -- without a doubt -- one day lose out to the settled peoples.

Of course, their ultimate defeat was not really a given for much of recorded history, as we know it.

This means that the steppe societies’ actual military achievements – which are many-- are not fully regarded or analyzed.

In his final chapter, the author clearly lays out the challenges faced when he tackled his huge subject in a compressed format.

Dangers of a Short Book. Before undertaking this assignment (for the second time), he realized that “*A short book, however, risks both simplifying the nature of war in order to provide a clear account and using a causal narrative. . . All then falls into a pat analysis, with technological proficiency in weaponry generally the means of proficiency.*” (p.240)

Well, it looks like Professor Black has pretty much succeeded in sidestepping those risks.

So, I recommend that you carefully place this compact, erudite little volume on that long Jeremy Black bookshelf in your personal library.

By now, you already realize that you will always find out fascinating stuff from this emeritus scholar – facts that you simply hadn’t known before you read him.

For instance, I discovered that the last bear in Germany was shot in 1797. And, later, I also found out that the Sinicized Manchu dynasty, formerly steppe warriors, were strategically nimble enough to develop a naval capacity that allowed them to capture Taiwan in 1683.

Warfare never repeats itself . . . right? Always something to learn.

A Short History of War, by Jeremy Black. New Haven: Yale, 2021. Pp. x, 258. Biblio., index. \$25.00, ISBN 978-0-3002-5651-2; e-editions.

– Richard Jupa

Ends of War:

The Unfinished Fight of Lee's Army after Appomattox,

by Caroline E. Janney

Caroline E. Janney evokes the human drama of Appomattox and the memory of Confederate soldiers at the end of the Civil War. She does a great job utilizing many primary sources in detailing the perspective of officers and enlisted men both, relating their stories from when the guns went silent and on their journeys home. This is history at its best by a wonderful author and historian.

Many – perhaps most – Confederate soldiers did not know what the end of the war would mean for them, their families, and the South as they left Appomattox. Even before the surrender, the demobilization of Lee's army had begun, as men deserted before Lee went to meet Grant. They flooded the countryside, some just wanting to go home, others hoping to continue the fight, perhaps would join Joe Johnston's army in North Carolina or the remaining armies further south and west. The 28,000 or so men who remained for the formal surrender, to be paroled by April 12, 1865, were perhaps half the number who had been with the army just a few months earlier. Janney argues that the loyalty of Lee's troops finally unraveled due to fatigue, fear for their families, and disillusionment with the Southern cause.

Janney makes the exceptional argument that Grant should have detailed terms more clearly, though she also recognizes that he had to act rapidly as conditions on the ground changed from day to day. She further asserts that Francis Lieber, author of the Union's 'rules of war', and others worried that Grant was overstepping his authority in making the terms with Lee that ultimately allowed paroles to operate as a blanket pardon.

Janney discusses how the complex the system of managing the military paroles followed the surrender on April 9th, and Grant's problems with political leaders following Lincoln's assassination over the terms offered.

Ends of War is also the story of the free and enslaved African Americans who were in various ways attached to Lee's army. Many wanted to go home, but there were issues of how, when, and where they could go in every state of the erstwhile Confederacy. Janney asserts many people of color were forced to accompany their

masters home, and the journey home often involved much privation, the need to beg for or steal food, and some arguably ended up in worse circumstance than when the war had started.

Janney makes an extraordinary point, that in the case of many soldiers their commitment to the Confederacy did not end with the capitulation on April 9, 1865. Many former Confederates – civilian as well as veterans, were enraged by the occupation of their states by Federal soldiers and former slaves celebrating liberty and enjoying its fruits. Their response to this was to become an important voting bloc, which over time played a significant role in obstructing and ultimately ending Reconstruction and introducing Jim Crow. She argues in some ways the peace was harder than the fighting, and turned into a test for the republic for generations.

This reviewer highly recommends *Ends of War* for both novices and seasoned students of the Civil War, and particularly for those with an interest in its end.

Ends of War: The Unfinished Fight of Lee's Army after Appomattox, by Caroline E. Janney. Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina Press, 2021. Pp. x, 334 . Illus., maps, notes, biblio., index. \$30.00, ISBN 978-1-4696-6337-1; e-editions.

--David Marshall

***Contested Commemoration:
The 1876 Centennial, Independence Day,
and the Reconstruction-era South,***
by Jack Noe

From the planning for the 1876 Centennial Fair in Philadelphia to the actual event, southerners viewed the commemoration of the one hundredth anniversary of American independence as a northern Republican event of little interest to the average southern white. Each state could send two representatives to serve on the planning committee, but white southerners rejected the appointment of Republicans and even moderate Democrats to represent them. The appointment of Congressman John Roy Lynch, African American and Republican, as one of Louisiana's commissioners, would misrepresent the state, suggesting the nefarious desires of those who supported the southern states supporting the national commemoration and exhibition. If the southern states decided to participate, only white Democrats who redeemed their states from the evil of Republican and black rule could accurately reflect southerners. Many southern politicians and newspaper editors denounced the commemoration as northern avarice and trickery. Only two southern states, Arkansas, and Mississippi, agreed to create state exhibitions at the fair. A faction of Democrats, "New Departure" Democrats shared the reservations about the commemoration but argued southern

participation in the Philadelphia exhibition would bring economic benefits to their states. Southern states generally refused to donate funds to support the Centennial because of antipathy to Republicans and widely expressed anger at Republican rule in the South during Reconstruction and the extension of rights to African Americans. Southern whites portrayed themselves as an abused population making a mockery of the values of the American Revolution that northerners intended to celebrate in 1876. African Americans viewed the commemoration as an opportunity to reinforce their identity as Americans and their place in American society as equal citizens.

For African Americans, their hopes failed to turn into reality at the exhibition. Efforts to create a sculpture of AME founder Richard Allen got sidelined and the bust of Allen spent a century in storage at Wilberforce College. Members of the Centennial organization showed little interest in the active joining of African American women with other women's groups at the Exhibition. African Americans were banned from employment as guards or service on the Centennial police and were hired only as barbers and waiters. There was truly little African American presence at the Centennial except for the work *Death of Cleopatra* by African American sculptor Edmonia Lewis. Members of the Centennial Committee showed no interest in promoting the accomplishments of African Americans or treating them as equal citizens. Although the Exhibition was held in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania for African Americans it felt like Philadelphia, Mississippi.

The second-class status of African Americans at the Centennial did not placate southerners. A repudiation of Reconstruction would have endeared southerners, and the failure to include a commemoration of the valiant Lost Cause of the Confederacy alienated southern public opinion. From a southern perspective, the inclusion of a large painting *Battle of Gettysburg*, a second painting *Emancipation*, and a bronze *The Abolition of Slavery* insulted the sentiments of any real southerner and showed a lack of sensitivity by the organizers of the Centennial. Southern visitors and newspaper editors denounced the Exhibition for sectionalism and as an expression of Radical Republicanism. Any commemoration of the end of slavery or emphasis on the negative aspects of slavery outraged southerners. The *Battle of Gettysburg* appeared intended to honor the brave Union soldiers and discredit the valiant efforts of the courageous men of the Confederacy. Organizers of the Centennial hoped for national unity, but it reinforced the southern identification with the Lost Cause and a separate regional identity.

In the period after the Civil War during Reconstruction most southerners refused to honor Independence Day. Few communities celebrated the holiday. Southerners did not identify with American nationalism that Independence Day symbolized. People in the South, although defeated, remained loyal to the memory of the Confederate States and to the Confederate war dead. The South was in America but not part of the United States. Southerners saw Independence Day as a commemoration of northern tyranny and Republican efforts to humiliate and torture the South. As southern Democrats redeemed southern states and ousted Republican governments, communities in 1875 and 1876 became more amenable to bring back celebrations and parades on the Fourth of July. In 1876, some tied sectional issues to the celebrations, used them as an opportunity to raise funds for monuments for the Confederate war dead, and flew the Confederate Battle Flag beside the Stars and Stripes. At many of the celebrations in 1876 southerners emphasized the time had come to redeem the national government from Republicanism by electing Democrat Samuel Tilden of New York to the presidency. The Solid South would back the Democrats and redemption from misguided and torturous Republicans. In the South in 1875 and 1876 the resumption of Fourth of July events expressed a sectional and partisan perspective.

Jack Noe wrote an engaging and compelling account of the use of commemorative activity for sectional and partisan purposes. Southerners viewed the Centennial not as a celebration of national unity, but as a reinforcement of the South's grievances from the Civil War and Reconstruction. It became an opportunity to stress the unique southern identity and the southern view of the Civil War and Reconstruction later adopted by the Dunning School of historiography and the popular presentations in *The Birth of A Nation* and *Gone With The Wind*.

Contested Commemoration: The 1876 Centennial, Independence Day, and the Reconstruction-era South, by Jack Noe. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2021. Pp. viii, 232. Notes, biblio., index. \$45.00, ISBN 978-0-8071-7558-3; e-editions available

-- Harvey Strum

A Short History of the Spanish Civil War,
 by Julián Casanova

This revised edition of his 2012 work, Prof. Casanova (Zaragoza) offers what is perhaps the best introductory look at Spain's 1936-1939 civil war. He treats this contentious subject quite well. Though sympathetic to the Republic, he is

even-handed in his coverage. For example, we see that particularly early in the war, atrocities by Republican supporters were as common as those by the Nationalists, and Casanova offers some good analysis of political and military errors by the successive Republican governments that impeded the war effort.

After a short look at the deep background of the events of 1936-1939, Casanova covers them in several themed chapters, which address the Nationalist conspiracy and coup, how they led to civil war, the horrors committed by both sides in the immediate aftermath of the failure of the coup, the internationalization of the war, and so forth, concluding with a look at the decades-long oppression of the Franco regime.

This reviewer found two issues that could have been better covered, albeit this is a flaw common to most books on the war:

- Too little attention to the inability of the “Popular Front” government to maintain a “Popular Front”, in contrast to the Nationalists, whose supporters were arguably as fractious as those of the Republicans.
- The failure of the Republic to use the military resources that remained loyal, amounting to about half the army.

As an introductory work, there is less coverage of military matters than some readers may prefer, but this is a valuable read for anyone with some interest in this conflict.

A Short History of the Spanish Civil War, by Julián Casanova. New York: Bloomsbury, 2021. Pp. xx, 218. Illus., maps, notes, biblio., index. \$19.95 paper, ISBN 978-1-3501-5255-7; hard cover and e-editions. —A. A. Nofi

***Ancient Greeks at War:
 Warfare in the Classical World,
 from Agamemnon to Alexander,***
 by Simon Elliott

This ambitious military chronicle is essentially an overview; a comprehensive survey, smoothly written by an expert popularizer of ancient history. A *tour de force*, the book is lavishly illustrated – though it must be mentioned up front that the work is unencumbered by footnotes. (The publishers probably concluded that these would slow the intended general readership down.)

Dr. Elliott, both a prolific writer and a veteran archeologist, elucidates the nuts and bolts of Greek/Macedonian armor, weapons, generalship, naval vessels, and tactical arrangements, as well as the specifics of a dozen crucial battles.

Moreover, Elliott succinctly lays out the social, economic, religious, geographical, and political factors underlying the incessant warfare that characterized these societies.

True, there is a *lot* of territory that Dr. Elliott chooses to cover...over thousands of years.

The reader first encounters a glossary, followed by an extensive timeline. Both are useful. I find it odd, however, to position such specific material up front; this kind of basic information is far more often in appendices.

Next is the first of five chronological chapters. Beginning in roughly 2000 B.C.E., this section tackles the misty histories of the island Minoans, the growth of the mainland’s Dorian-Greek Mycenaeans, and even the mysterious Sea Peoples, who shattered several Bronze Age polities. Apparently, these nasty maritime bandits may have had a few Greek elements within their ranks. I am looking at you, Philistines.

The stage is set for the Dark Age, the Archaic Period, and the glories of Classical civilization. Of course, the Persian and Peloponnesian wars receive a full review. Athens, Sparta, and Thebes all have their time in the sun. Then we have the rise of the northern Macedonian cousins and their shaping of the Hellenistic world.

The last of the five historical chapters ends with a grand finale – the Roman takeover of Greece. Dr. Elliott examines the steps by which a semi-Hellenized Italian republic ultimately vanquished both sturdy alliances of cities and Alexander’s powerful Successor kingdoms.

This triumph occurred largely because Rome was able to apply a nimble tactical organization on the battlefield – one more flexible than the stiffer – and, by then, stagnant – Graeco-Macedonian fighting system.

The “Anvil” and the “Hammer”. In his sixth and penultimate chapter, Dr. Elliott explains the developmental stages of “the anvil” – *i.e.*, a blacksmith metaphor (probably coined by the Macedonians), which referred to the battle role of a dense core of ranked infantry spearmen.

This basic unit was the phalanx, composed of a city-state’s citizens, called hoplites. Its purpose was to fix an opposing line in place and then push back against it until morale broke, which led to disintegration.

After 700 B.C.E., the average phalanx consisted of a block of armored hoplites, arrayed in files 8 deep, carrying shields and thrusting spears that were roughly 8 feet long.

Over time, refinements like light auxiliaries – such as slingers or javelin throwers – were added to erode the enemy before contact. The Greeks tended to neglect archers and cavalry in their tactical systems. Certain cities added their own improvements: like, in Sparta’s case, intensified, continuous training that created a professional military caste.

Around the 300s B.C.E., the phalanx had become much denser. In the Royal Macedonian

army’s version, well-armored soldiers were assembled in files 16 deep, sporting 14-18 foot-long pikes (the sarissa) that took both hands to carry. The massive power of the unit’s advance had been greatly multiplied -- but so had its rigidity, which was the fatal weakness that the Romans later exploited.

Elliot then explores the crucial addition of “the hammer.” This extension of the blacksmith metaphor refers to supplementary forces like hard-charging lance cavalry and mobile elite infantry. These elements were mostly developed and utilized under innovators like Phillip II and his brilliant son. In synch with the pike-phalanx, the combination was devastating

In other words, the anvil continued to pin its opposite, but now the hammer pounded an opening through a weak point, or smashed at a flank, even if enemy cohesion elsewhere generally remained intact. That cohesion would often crumble, however, once the hammer was able to rain its blows on the rear of the line.

An Expert Guide. Fortunately, the author has the credentials to navigate readers through this vast and ill-documented historical journey. Besides his career as an archeologist and broadcaster, Dr. Elliott is a best-selling historian of several books on ancient conflict, such as *Romans at War* (Casemate, 2020). He currently serves as a Trustee of the Council for British Archeology.

This kind of interpretative expertise is particularly necessary in a broad-brush review of a slice of ancient history, given the many drawbacks – or complete absence – of its sources, which allow for much squabbling among scholars.

The author readily earns the reader’s trust by how he efficiently interprets such disputed issues in either his narrative or analyses. He presents the various arguments, announces which one he most favors, and why -- then moves on.

Dr. Elliot also includes 12 separate battle boxes that highlight particularly crucial engagements, especially those of Alexander against the Persians and the Diadochi against themselves. Of necessity, there are 7 two-page maps, which are clear and colorful. Nevertheless, several more, with a greater range of locations and terrain features would have been quite helpful.

Elliott is particularly thorough in presenting the fascinating career of Phillip II. This monarch’s memorable military achievements carved a Macedonian imperium out of the Greek world; yet, this major feat was soon eclipsed by those of his son, who overthrew Persia and briefly created the world’s largest empire. Overshadowed by his offspring, one-eyed Phillip

doesn’t get enough credit for his brilliant reforms of the Greek way of war.

For instance, this reviewer (who considers himself fairly familiar with ancient history) was surprised to learn that some of Phillip’s early conquests were not preemptive attacks or driven by mere lust for territorial expansion. Instead, these land-grabs were strategic, intended to build up his core of heavy cavalry, which later proved to be so crucial a component of the “hammer” in Macedonian tactics.

Phillip wanted to provide “estates for his growing number of companion shock cavalry,” the author relates, “almost like a feudal lord would do to secure his knights’ financial security.”

Now, I would not have expected such detail to appear in a general survey work, so I applaud Dr. Elliott for his thorough research. This revealing insight is only one of many fresh (if unfootnoted) nuggets of information that he scatters through his comprehensive volume.

Here are a few more of the author’s fascinating tidbits:

- He notes that the word for the battle gear of Indian elephants was “*hattathara*”.
- He furnishes complete assignment lists of satrap governorships by Successor regents – first, Perdiccas right after Alexander’s death, and then Antipar’s after he squashed a mutiny of the field army in 320 B.C.E.
- He introduces us to the narcissistic tyrant of Athens, Demetrius of Phalerum, who erected 360 monuments across the city extolling his accomplishments. The son of Antigonas overthrew him in 307 B.C.E., and the Athenians immediately smashed the “former guy’s” statues, fashioning chamber pots from the wreckage.

In short, I fully recommend this excellent survey for anyone seeking a solid grounding in Greek and Macedonian warfare systems, as we understand them now.

For those who have finished Dr. Elliott’s book and who wish to explore aspects of its subject more deeply, I recommend two other fairly recent works:

The Bronze Lie: Shattering the Myth of Spartan Warrior Supremacy, by Myke Cole, published by Osprey Bloomsbury in 2021. The title says it all, which is also true of the second book, *An Invincible Beast: Understanding the Hellenistic Pike-Phalanx at War*, by Christopher Matthew, from Pen & Sword in 2012, which features a reconstructive, hands-on testing method of the sarissa. Elliott himself includes *Invincible Beast* in his suggestions for further reading.

Ancient Greeks at War: Warfare in the Classical World, from Agamemnon to Alexander, by Simon Elliott. Philadelphia and Oxford: Casemate, 2021. Pp. 288. Illus., maps, chron., gloss., biblio., index. \$39.95, ISBN 978-1-6120-0998-8; e- editions. ----- -- Richard Jupa

Future War and the Defence of Europe,

by John R Allen, Frederick Ben Hodges, and Julian Lindley-French

The best part of John R. Allen, F. Ben Hodges, and Julian Lindley-French's *Future War and the Defence of Europe* is that they plainly lay out a detailed litany of failed historical opportunities enough to discomfort all but the most delusionary worshippers of appeasement and pacifism.

The worst part of *Future War* is its near-numbing repetitive warning that Western Europe (hereinafter referred for simplicity only as Europe) is in danger from an unrealistic, over-reliance on United States military protection coupled with Europe's pattern of disunity and failing its own role to properly deter foreseeable threats. With the recent and continuing suffering of the Ukrainian people subjected to Russia's invasion, the saddest part of *Future War* is that its warning has come too late.

While the authors' writing style certainly suggests military PowerPoints and lecture notes, the two generals and professor offer a compelling record of European head-in-the-sand tendencies from Britain's infamous "Ten Year Rule" before the Second World War, which perennially assumed that no major war would occur within ten years, to Europe's continued lackluster responses to threats from Russia, China, Islamic Extremist Insurgents, and the Covid-19 Pandemic.

The authors' main theme is that Europe's Covid-19 response clearly highlighted the inability of Europe to unite in the face of common threats, with the evidence of a biological crisis capable of destroying European economies and causing widespread societal disruptions on scales only hoped for by past conventional "strategic" military attacks. As an example of current events upsetting the prophecies of *Future War*, however, Russian president Putin's 2022 attack on Ukraine has been now cited as a unifying catalyst for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Europe.

While Putin's "military operation" has brought some apparent unity to the Alliance, a closer examination of the disputes over transferring MiG-29s and the refusal of any direct military intervention puts a jaundiced taint on any rosy claims of unanimity. *Future War* specifically reviews a history of NATO commitments to

defense spending, which predictably decayed after their initial celebrations. The authors remain fundamentally correct in their overall analysis of Europe's vulnerability.

By no means are the authors alone in their view. Despite the author's repeated skewering of former President Trump, their conclusion is hardly distinguishable from the former President's coarse handling of NATO. Nor are they voices in the wilderness, echoed as they are by Andrew Michta and many others; Meike Eijlsberg, a former Washington D.C. French embassy military attaché, who writes that NATO can no longer count on President Biden's United States, and Jean-Paul Palomeros, former French Air Force Chief of Staff, admitted on France24 that NATO had not been pulling its own weight.

But regardless of how current events may have questioned some of the authors' assumptions, *Future War* remains relevant. The authors correctly point out that warfare in the interconnected globalized environment of the digitized networked "Fourth Industrial Revolution" erases any distinction between the battlefield and home front, military and civilian targets, and has particularly heightened the danger to Europe. If anything, Putin's bombardment of Ukrainian civilians, bot misinformation, economic and nuclear blackmail, disregard of international opinion and sanctions, thoroughly support *Future War's* understanding that modern war can exist on multi-layer, multi-directional, broad fronts.

Future War begins with a hypothetical disaster scenario from opportunistic synergistic attacks from Russia, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Islamic Extremist Insurgents under the expected near future state of European readiness, if the authors' warning are not heeded. The weakness in Europe's response to another pandemic emergency is then explored, including an overview of historical plagues, to set the Fourth Industrial Revolution context.

The authors follow with a very informative recount of Europe's post Second World War excessive dependence on the United States, before discussing the Russian threat to Europe's East and North, Islamic Extremist Insurgent asymmetric threat to Europe's South, and PRC's distraction to the United States which compounds the extreme overall danger to Europe, with each threat analyzed in historical and current detail. The authors continue with a critique of Europe's limited capacity to defend itself to fill out the authors' Fourth Industrial Revolution thesis of Europe's lack of preparedness for "Hyperwar" digital and nuclear developments. (As this review is being written during the Ukraine Crisis, the Royal Navy's entire fleet of new Type 45 destroyers are all laid

up in dock with engine trouble despite being a more prepared member of NATO.)

Finally, prescriptions for necessary reforms are offered concluding with a revised optimistic scenario of successfully fending off major threats to Europe, if the authors are heeded. Loosely stated, the authors propose a new more realistic balance in the relationship between the overly-extended U.S. and overly-dependent Europe, with investments in defense combining levels of private-public collaboration in civilian and military infrastructure and technology as suggested by the successful harnessing of U.S. private industry during the Second World War.

Central to the authors' thesis is that the European vulnerabilities exposed by the pandemic response showed that time is running out for reform: lack of coordinated allied response; failure to maintain parity with U.S., Russia, and PRC capabilities; unwillingness to address known weaknesses; inadequate investment in Europe's own security. Russia's attack on Ukraine has merely spotlighted those vulnerabilities again, only sooner than anticipated.

According to the authors, NATO's main function is to project credible deterrence, and such vulnerabilities undermine NATO's own reason for existence. Should a major war ever come, the authors say, then regardless of NATO's actual preparation or performance, the organization would have already failed its main mission. In the case of current events, Ukraine, while not a NATO member, can attest to how aggressors can ignore promises of collective security and threats of economic sanctions, absent credible military intervention. A similar testament is readily available from China for Japan's 1931 invasion or from Ethiopia for Italy's 1935 invasion.

While the recent pathetic performance of the Russian military might offer comfort to the doomsday envisioned by the authors, the fact remains that the *Future War* authors have not miscalculated Europe's lack of deterrent strength, even if Putin miscalculated and is forced to resort to attritional grinding of the resistant Ukrainians. The stalled advances of Putin's invasion, tied to rail and road routes, at least for the muddy season, brings to mind Japan's self-destructive invasion into China, when the world then also failed to deter aggression. Japan's 1930s occupation of China's territory was also limited similarly to rail routes and roads, with Japan's supply and resources crippled by stubborn nationalistic Chinese resistance. Back then, the world's failure to deter aggression ultimately led to global war, with heavy costs to both aggressors and defenders alike. *Future War* attempts to avoid

that historical route.

Future War understands that a current "major war" is not as easily defined as perhaps in history, when now unclaimed cyber attacks or biological attacks can devastate an opponent without using any hypersonic missile or even any traditional conventional bullets and bayonets. The situation is made even more difficult because the traditional tools of incremental invasions, surrogate insurgencies, economic warfare, and nuclear hostage taking remain fully functional in the aggressor's arsenal. Europe's failure to deter Putin despite being fully aware of Putin's plans proves the point of *Future War*. Russia could snip off consecutive chunks of the Ukraine, Iran can continually fund terrorists, the PRC can blockade Taiwan, and stare downs from nuclear arsenals or even rogue suitcase bombs remain potentially viable scenarios. The fact that Putin's bark may apparently have at this point exceeded Putin's conventional military bite (or even his ability to swallow or digest) does not detract from the warning embodied in *Future War*.

Yes, *Future War* fails to account for the apparent incompetence and limitations of aggressors in the authors' presumption of worst case scenarios. The authors do not dwell on the internal conflicts within the three separate threats. Nor do they adequately address how the three presumed threats have continued frictions between them which hinder their coordination. China's claims to ancient territories clash with the borders of Russia's Far East. Islamic insurgents can find much discontent in Russia and the PRC's treatment of minorities. And while Taiwan might be the PRC's flashpoint so far as the U.S. policy might be concerned, Vietnam with its more recent shooting conflicts with the PRC and Vietnam's more Ukraine-analogous geographic continuity with the PRC might provide an even more confusing dilemma for stability in Asia.

In addition, the authors' focus on Europe understandably disregards how irritating their whole discussion might be to what used to be called the Third World. For instance, the Third World rarely receives the current levels of sympathy for similar hardships being suffered by Ukrainians. However, while the world's economic, military and political weight concentrated in Europe and the U.S. warrants greater analytic attention, such disregard does tend to overlook the potential long term opportunity for competing powers like the PRC to further complicate global threats by expanding into any vacuum of interest in the Third World.

But the authors' warnings remain on point. Even without coordinated attacks, the threat of combined crises remains genuine. The world's

united voice, with the exception of a handful of nations, still failed to deter Putin’s bombardment and starvation of Ukrainian civilians. All those who fervently delude themselves that diplomacy functions without a threat of violence should realize that reason does not always triumph over barbarity. A child’s singing video and virtual flag waving are not actual substitutes for ammunition. As their president noted, the Ukrainians need ammunition, not a ride.

While the world might breathe easier over the apparent incompetence of Putin’s war machine, the world cannot shield its eyes from the damage already done to once vibrant Ukrainian cities and towns reduced to rubble by the failure of international law lacking adequate military enforcement. While Ukraine has been receiving ammunition resupplies from friendly nations, such resupplies draw down the available stocks of ammunition, and the need to replenish such supplies will fall into the problem recognized by *Future War* that historically Europe prefers excessive spending for butter over guns, while the U.S. unsustainably foots the cost of the guns. Russian supplies may have been similarly exhausted by Putin’s folly, but Putin might secure PRC supplies and/or resupply more quickly than Europe, while still wielding the same nuclear threat that currently paralyzes any direct military response to limit his aggression. And despite the poor Russian performance in Ukraine so far, there is no guarantee that the Russian military won’t ameliorate their problems and ultimately emerge “victorious” as the Russians have managed in the past.

Nor should the warnings in *Future War* of possible PRC aggression against Taiwan be discounted, as PRC leaders are undoubtedly timing the endurance of the sanctions against Putin’s misconduct. At a minimum, the whole world has now seen how U.S. and European guarantees of security are dependent on easy land routes for resupply, which does not exist for the island of Taiwan, or even Vietnam (which does not even have any verbal guarantees of security). It would be foolish to assume that rogue actors are not taking copious notes on how to minimize damage from future sanctions, so that they can continue the exact threats envisioned by *Future War*.

Recent events have definitely dated some of the suppositions in *Future War*, but the lessons offered by the authors are no less relevant today than before Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. The authors have provided a valuable collection of the history and a snapshot of Europe’s vulnerability. Whether the current crisis will fade that snapshot will be decided in the months ahead. At the very least, an old copy of *Future War* might one day provide valuable insight into

the current debate for future historians

Future War and the Defence of Europe, by John R. Allen, Frederick Ben Hodges, and Julian Lindley-French. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. xx, 332. Notes, biblio., index. \$32.95, ISBN 978-0-1988-5583-5; e-editions.

--Ching Wah Chin

NYMAS On C-SPAN

Many NYMAS programs have [aired](#) on C-SPAN, most recently including Prof. Marc Gallicchio’s “[U.S. War Against Japan, 1944-1945](#)” (Oct. 5, 2018), Prof. Gregory Daddis’s “[U.S. Strategy in Vietnam War’s Final Years](#)” (Oct. 19, 2018), Maj. David Lambert’s “[Gunpowder Manufacturing Between 1850-65](#)” (Feb. 15, 2019), and Prof. Kathleen Broome Williams’ “[Scottish World War II Combat Artist George Plante](#)” (Mar. 15, 2019),

Masséna at Bay, 1811,

by Tim Saunders.

To set the stage with the key events preceding Tim Saunders' *Masséna at Bay 1811*, paramount is the bloody battle of Wagram fought in July, 1809 which had decisive ramifications, most significantly the Treaty of Schonbrunn which cemented Napoleon’s imperial grip on Europe. The British belated response, the feebly concocted and ineptly executed Walcheren expedition led the Tory government under Portland to seek something to relieve domestic concern over the litany of defeats, and cultivated the illusion that the Iberian Peninsula was not a military sideshow and that Arthur Wellesley’s costly and transitory victory at Talavera warranted his elevation to the peerage as Viscount Wellington. Wellington promptly then presented, somewhat petulantly, a 2500 word letter in August to Castlereagh, secretary of war – just as his army was in retreat and in dire straits, despite Talavera -- a case for abandoning Spain to its own military fate. This letter ought to be seen in the English speaking world as the pivotal document instrumental in consigning the Spanish empire to the ash heap of history. In this screed, which reads more like a plaintiff’s wail and a xenophobic one at that, Wellington bemoaned his army’s maltreatment by Britain’s ally Spain and basically committed himself and his army and, *ipso facto*, Britain – as there was literally no credible alternative general with equivalent political clout – to under no circumstances undertake joint operations with Spanish armies even if he were assigned as Commander-in-Chief. For the next twenty months this was so, to the chagrin of Spain, his ally.

Meanwhile, Napoleon tightened the economic noose of the Continental system over Britain and, adding further insult to injury, sent in April,

1810, almost as an afterthought, a very reluctant Marshal André Masséna, newly dubbed the Prince d'Essling, with reinforcements to Spain and the mission of ousting the English from the continent. Napoleon, it should be noted, did not deign to go himself, as he was enjoying his battle won conjugal rights with the young Marie Louise and overseeing what would become the Code Napoleon, while mostly disapproving everything that Masséna would subsequently do. That was then, and ever since British historians have dedicated themselves to the unabashed hero worship of Arthur Wellesley.

Tim Saunders has dutifully followed suit in his work *Masséna at Bay 1811*. In October, 1809, Wellington opted for a more comfortable Fabian strategy exclusively devoted to retrograde maneuvers back into the confining geography of Portugal, a good portion of which was laid to waste by scorched earth tactics, on his orders, and entirely dependent on British officered elements and buttressed by the fabled lines of Torres Vedras.

To put Saunders' work and the much ballyhooed exploits of Wellington into proper perspective: from August, 1809 to April, 1811 when the Viscount finally condoned his army's cooperation with the Spanish, the following Spanish cities and fortresses fell: Gerona, Lerida, Tortosa, Astorga, Ciudad Rodrigo, Seville, Cordoba, Granada, Malaga and eventually Badajoz. More detrimental even than those losses were the consistent defeats of regular forces pitted against Napoleon's that would prove positively cataclysmic for the future of Spain. After Talavera, Spain still fielded large armies thanks to the Central Junta – later the Regency – employing *levees en masse*, a means of last resort, tried and tested by the French Revolution and which Wellington, Tory that he was, pooh-poohed as merely 'enthusiasm.' During this period, despite many pleadings by the Spanish for Wellington's assistance, French marshals systematically whittled down Spanish armies starting with the battles of Almonacid, Ocaña, and Alba de Tormes, until reverses were inevitable and the Spanish, by 1813, became nothing more than fairly active guerrilla bands. All the while Britain duplicitously supported Spanish insurgencies in South America – Miranda and Bolivar in particular – and sought trade concessions which undermined Spanish financing for defense, forcing them to beg for handouts from Britain, which were never sufficiently forthcoming. All this while the Royal Navy totally dominated everywhere there was sea water.

Masséna at Bay, 1811, never really questions Wellington's egregious decision to abandon Spain, but does indulge in his adulation. This

praise is justified when it comes to Wellington's outstanding foresight in ordering engineer Lt. Col. Sir Richard Fletcher, in October 1809, to construct the lines of Torres Vedras; a series of what would be well defended redoubts stretched across the throat of Portugal that eventually did what they were intended. Masséna's three corps would indeed end up corralled in an impossible position, as Wellington anticipated. However, they lingered around Santerem longer than he expected. The lines required Portuguese laborers, militia, guns, and a fleet ready to embark Wellington's army at a moment's notice. This was done at great expense and an odd contrast with the paltry amounts Britain gave to the Spanish fighting the bulk of Napoleon's forces in Spain. It should be added by contrast that Napoleon's commitment to Spain, although massive, was almost entirely paid for by bleeding Spain dry of revenue.

This work does a fine job bringing to life the period with photos of reenactors uniformed and accoutered as contemporaries would have been on a nice day. The accompanying maps follow the KISS principle a little too closely but do serve a good purpose in aligning place names with the text. Of special note are the paintings of obscure officers such as Juan Sanchez, and landscapes from the past, such as Coimbra. Compared to Sir Charles Oman's two volumes dealing with Masséna's time in the Peninsula, and his rigorous penchant for resolving inconsistencies, it is understandable that Tim Saunders settles for some easier explanations. One disputable point that Oman belabors, but Mr. Saunders does not, is the issue regarding the planned retreat of Masséna. Mr. Saunders puts too much stock in the assertions of a Captain Noel, an artillery officer, who claimed that Ney deliberately foiled Masséna's plan to move north of the Mondego River and remain in Portugal. This is refuted by Oman in detail citing, most importantly, Masséna's report to Berthier in which Masséna's reasons for dismissing Ney never once mentions the latter's refusal to retake Coimbra, the main crossing point on the Mondego. This is a classic case of not giving due credit to the Portuguese militia brigades. British Captain Nicholas Trant, a Portuguese brigadier general, took Coimbra and held with some 4,000 Portuguese troops the entire time Masséna was in southern Portugal at Santarem, unable to attack the lines of Torres Vedras, which thus denied the French marshal the operational option of moving north.

As is usual, Spanish and Portuguese militia brigades under Trant, Wilson, Miller, Juan Sanchez, and Silveira are dismissed in the tally of forces opposing Masséna. To give them their due, the French, on occasion, had to peel off

entire divisions to deal with these formations which adds luster to Masséna's record for hanging on as long as he did, when adding these militias into the odds.

The battles are handled well, but certain engagements, such as the complex cavalry maneuvers at Fuentes de Oñoro (spelt differently on several maps) are still in need of unraveling. Perhaps Edward Charles Cocks, the most outstanding of intelligence officers, ought to be the baseline for doing so, with due regard for Julian Sanchez's lancers. It is always a find if there are original eyewitness accounts and the one that is most interesting is that of Mainwaring and the burning of the colors.

One last error that is a pet peeve, is the inflated numbers of killed in the village of Fuentes de Oñoro. These seem to have been taken from Oman and actually include killed, wounded, and missing. Otherwise, *Masséna at Bay, 1811* is a splendid addition to any Napoleonic library.

Masséna at Bay, 1811, by Tim Saunders. Barnsley, Eng.: Pen & Sword / Philadelphia: Casemate, 2021. Pp. viii, 264. Illus., maps, diagr., appends., notes, index. \$42.95, ISBN, 978-1-3990-0132-8; e- editions.

—Frank Radford

Reading Lucan's Civil War, A Critical Guide,
 edited by Paul Roche.

Lucan's epic poem *De Bello Civile*, also known as *Pharsalia*, his only surviving work, deals with the civil war between Caesar and the Senatorial leaders, led by Pompey the Great, was written about a century after the events described. Albeit unfinished, due to Lucan's execution by Nero, it includes a wealth of ideas and information of possible value to anyone interested in the history of the war.

While the introduction and fifteen papers in this volume primarily address the work as a literary classic, virtually all also shed some light on political and military matters, often with comparisons to how other epics – notably those of Homer and Virgil – treated similar events, and they usually consider Lucan's sources, likely of interest to the historian. In addition, these papers explore Lucan's life as a member of Nero's artistic circle, and how it may have influenced the rather subversive slant in his treatment of the events, in contrast to earlier Julio-Claudian court authors.

Reading Lucan's Civil War is a useful read for anyone interested in the Roman civil wars or the collapse of the Republic.

Reading Lucan's Civil War, A Critical Guide, edited by Paul Roche. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2021. Pp. x, 338. Map, gloss., notes, biblio., index. \$34.95 paper, ISBN 978-0-8061-6939-2; e- editions. —A. A. Nofi

***Voices of the Army of the Potomac:
 Personal Reminiscences of Union Veterans***,
 by Vincent L. Burns

Even before the guns fell silent, soldiers on both sides of the Civil War, viewed themselves as the guardians of the history of the struggle. Often combatants would provide people back home with written accounts of battles and the specific accomplishments of individuals. Postwar, the veterans presented their memories and analyses and wrote about the great fight, often explaining how each of the various states, units, and even nationalities contributed. The veterans of the Civil War became the first historians, penning letters, diaries, journals, and reports during it, and in the postwar period memoirs, regimental histories, accounts of campaigns and battles, even pension claims, speeches, and more, creating an impressive mass of material, which is at times most useful to the student of the war.

The accounts by the veterans of the Army of the Potomac were perhaps most important in influencing the story of the war, having fought in the Eastern Theater against Robert E. Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia. This work, by Vincent Burns, is rather like a forum in which their works – some of them – are displayed to inform and even entertain students of the war.

Burns includes anecdotal stories from officers and common soldiers alike that help amplify our understanding of soldiering, camp life, and battle. We get soldiers' tales of the role of the Army of the Potomac in the struggle to attain victory in the fight to preserve the Union and end slavery. These help the readers walk in the shoes of those men who fought from 1861 through 1865 on many battlefields; 1st Bull Run the Peninsula, the Seven Days, 2nd Bull Run, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, the Overland Campaign and on to Appomattox. And we see their opinions of their generals; McDowell, McClellan, Pope, Meade and Grant. In addition, we get some insights into the post war meetings between veterans from both sides, leading to a measure of reconciliation.

Some readers may not agree with all of Burns' conclusions. For example, he asserts that the defeat at 1st Bull Run was due principally to poor command and control of the formations by General McDowell and his unit leaders. Burns also argues that many in the army believed that McClellan acknowledged defeat in the Seven Days Battles when he changed base to Harrison's Landing, while continuing to claim he had not been given sufficient numbers of troops.

Burns' writing is clear, detailed, and very balanced, and covers countless people. *Voices of the Army of the Potomac* is a riveting read that

brings a human element to the Army of the Potomac that will excite novices and veteran students alike. One of best accounts of the army that I have ever read, this is surely worth a place in any scholar's Civil War library as well as that of the buff.

Voices of the Army of the Potomac: Personal Reminiscences of Union Veterans, by Vincent L. Burns. Oxford and Philadelphia: Casemate, 2021. Pp. xx, 359. Illus., map, notes, biblio., index. \$37.95, ISBN 978-163624-072-5; e-editions. --David Marshall

***Proud Warriors:
 African American Combat Units
 in World Wart II,***

by Alexander M. Bielakowski

Professor Bielakowski is no stranger to the debate over minorities in combat for the United States, as evidenced by his previous writings. *Proud Warriors* is in keeping with those works, concentrating on the African American experience of the Second World War. A professor of history at the University of Houston-Downtown, having spent time at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Bielakowski is the editor-in-chief of the *U.S. Military History Review* journal. He conceived *Proud Warriors* as the one stop shop for any reader, both academic and lay, to learn more about the African American military experience. What sets this book apart from others is the focus on combat units, and not just a general description of the experiences.

Proud Warriors is broken into seven sections, each focusing on a specific period or technical category. Meticulously researched, the author guides the reader through a history of African American combat units from the beginnings of the nation through the Second World War. As he clearly states in the introduction, *Proud Warriors* is more of a general historiography of African Americans in the Second World War. A place to wet the appetite of an academic yearning for further guidance on the African American experience. For the lay reader, the book is the beginning of a learning journey, should they be so inclined to take it.

There is no question as to the importance of a book such as *Proud Warriors*. It is, however, quite unfortunate that the author sees fit to limit the amount of exposition for mere sequential facts. This leaves the reader having to go off on their own exploration by using the notes and bibliography as a springboard for further discovery. The book does have a unique place in the historiography of the Second World War; the only work that covers all African American combat units. For anyone looking to expand their perspective of the Second World War and

the African American experience in particular, *Proud Warriors* should be a must have on the shelf.

Proud Warriors: African American Combat Units in World Wart II, by Alexander M. Bielakowski. Denton, Tx.: University of North Texas Press, 2021. Pp. xiv, 335. Illus., maps, notes., biblio., index. \$29.95, ISBN 978-157441-829-2; e-editions.

-- Zane Whitney, Jr.

***The Bulgarian Contract:
 The Secret Lie that Ended the Great War,***
 by Graeme Sheppard

Did a rumor spread by a Bulgarian opposition politician that the Germans had made a contract with the Bulgarian government that they would no longer have to fight the Allied Powers after September 25th, 1918 begin the chain of events that led to the end of World War I? That is the interesting thesis of Graeme Sheppard in *The Bulgarian Contract*.

Sheppard's theory relies on the accounts of two British soldiers David J. Cowan and Robert Howe, who escaped from a Bulgarian prisoner-of-war camp and traveled to the Bulgarian capital, Sofia where they saw the collapse and surrender of Bulgaria to the Allies in the waning days of WWI. With Bulgaria out of the war, the Allied armies advanced toward Istanbul and Belgrade, leading Turkey to agree to an armistice with the Allies on October 30th, soon followed by Austria-Hungary on November 4th. Germany began negotiations for an armistice on November 8th, followed by the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm on the 10th, and the armistice itself on the 11th.

In the years after the First World War, Howe joined the British Foreign Service, serving in different posts, including Brazil, China, and Romania. He wrote an unpublished memoir in 1971, that Sheppard discovered in the course of his research for another book on an infamous murder in Peking.

It is this memoir and a letter that Cowan wrote to the British historian Cyril Falls (official historian of the Macedonian Campaign in WWI) regarding the Bulgarian Contract on which Sheppard relies to prove that the alleged document, was created by Bulgarian opposition politician Alexander Stamboliski in 1918, and spread by Stamboliski's confederates to undermine the morale of the Bulgarian Army, whose soldiers genuinely came to believe that the Germans had promised that Bulgaria would no longer have to fight after September 25th. Sheppard argues that by undermining the morale of the Bulgarian forces in Macedonia, the Contract was directly responsible for the breakthrough of the Allied Army of Macedonia

at the Battle of Dobro Pole on September 15. Therefore, he alleges, the Contract sparked the chain of events that ended the Great War.

In November 1922, Howe was sent to Belgrade, Yugoslavia as head of the Chancery of the British Delegation. There he ran into Stamboliski, who allegedly confirmed the story of the Bulgarian Contract and that he, Stamboliski, had invented the Contract. Cowan's letter to Falls apparently prompted the historian to research the Contract, but Falls did not find the available evidence convincing enough to include the story in the British Official History he wrote. Sheppard points to vague intelligence reports from the French about rumors that the Bulgarians would cease to fight after September 15 as additional proof, as well as a handful of allusions to the Contract in contemporary Bulgarian sources.

While the "Bulgarian Contract" story could plausibly have sparked the end of the Great War, I do not find the evidence presented by Sheppard sufficient to establish the existence of such a Contract. Additional research into Bulgarian, French, and British archives is needed. In particular, I would think that if the Contract was real, one should be able to find Bulgarian POWs from the period of September-October 1918 who would have mentioned the Contract when interrogated by Allied intelligence officers following the Battle of Dobro Pole. Otherwise this is just an interesting story. Still, I enjoyed Sheppard's weaving together of events in the crucial last months of the war, making this a worthy read for aficionados of WWI and diplomatic history.

The Bulgarian Contract: The Secret Lie that Ended the Great War, by Graeme Sheppard. Hong Kong: Earshaw Books, 2021. Pp. viii, 300. Illus., maps, notes, index. £16.65 paper, ISBN, 978-9-8885-5286-3; e-editions.

--Alexander Stavropoulos

***The Record of Murders and Outrages:
Racial Violence and the Fight Over Truth
at the Dawn of Reconstruction,***
by William Blair

Having delved deeply over the last thirty years into documents at the National Archives and the files of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, William Blair gives us a look at the enormous mass of evidence gathered by the government and the army during the early post war years and Reconstruction concerning atrocities committed across the South against African Americans. He demonstrates that President Johnson, many Democrats, and some conservative Republicans failed to believe – or simply ignored – the evidence of racist-inspired murders, assaults, rapes, church burnings, and

more that resulted from the white South's rejection of the terms of reunion which also fostered the emergence of the Ku Klux Klan. Many such persons claimed that the Radical Republicans were, in effect, promoting "fake news" in order to subject the South to military occupation and secure the votes of the freedmen for the Republican Party.

Blair, makes a strong argument that critics disregarded evidence of eye witnesses, whether black or white, and even military personnel and Freedmen's Bureau workers, to claim that crime against African Americans was no different from endemic violence common across the United States, a serious mischaracterization of events. Many critics claimed that whites were victims as well of violence perpetrated by Black people.

Blair demonstrates how, to confront President Andrew Johnson's hostility to Reconstruction, Freedmen's Bureau Commissioner Oliver O. Howard and his subordinates across the former secessionist states gathered numerous accounts of "murders and outrages" to reveal the degree of violence being used against African Americans and Southern Republicans, to disprove claims of a peaceful South, contradicting the President's policies and supporting "Radical Republican" efforts for continued military rule of the South.

The available evidence, often from African Americans testifying at some risk to their lives, showed that white supremacists were doing everything possible to restore racial dominance, and that even state and local courts offered no relief, usually failing to prosecute those guilty of wrongdoing.

The Bureau assessed that it received reports of only a fraction of the crimes committed against Black people, but Blair demonstrates that the evidence accumulated by Howard and his subordinates documenting conditions led to the adoption of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments, and slowed the restoration of civil government in several Southern states, especially Georgia.

Combining valuable, fresh historical detail with very compelling story-telling, *The Record of Murders And Outrages* will prove informative reading for anyone interested in Reconstruction and race relations in post bellum America, and is highly recommended.

The Record of Murders and Outrages: Racial Violence and the Fight Over Truth at the Dawn of Reconstruction, by William A. Blair. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2021. Pp. viii, 174. Tables, notes, index. \$19.95 paper, ISBN 978-1-4696-6345-6, hard back and e-editions.

--David Marshall

Air Battle for Moscow, 1941-1942,

by Dmitry Degtev and Dmitry Zubov

Writing two-sided history about the Eastern Front of the Second World War remains difficult. In recent years, historians have described major battles that, for decades, had been kept out of the historical record while battles put forward as models of mobile warfare have been shown to have been less dramatic, even if still terribly lethal. In 2022, the potential for destructive multi-domain warfare returning to the battlefields of this war, combined with the commitment of the current leadership in Moscow to repressing anything that contradicts what they perceive as their very own politically useful history, does not augur well for those writing (or reading) about the war in the east.

This books' two Russian authors, Dmitry Degtev and Dmitry Zubov, have set out to provide a balanced narrative of both sides' air operations around and over Moscow from July 1941 to April 1942. Starting with the "Moscow Blitz" by German night bombers, it covers the climactic German advance and the Soviet counterattack, starting in December, that continued through the winter and included some of the first Soviet airborne operations of the war.

The authors did this by "banging together" sources from both sides, although with no footnotes and only a page-and-a-half listing of book titles and (Soviet only) archival records, precisely how remains a matter of surmise. Having read lots of Soviet military magazines in the 1970s and 1980s, I could tell that their historical articles – which may have been based on the same archival sources – were also used. While the sources consulted for the German side of the story are far from comprehensive, the authors manage to cover much of both sides' missions, claims, and losses in a detailed narrative.

The authors show how stretched the Luftwaffe was by the time it started operating around Moscow. The "Moscow Blitz" was much smaller than that against London earlier in the year; some 600 sorties total in July-August, about what they had put over Britain on their most intense nights of bombing. Other significant Luftwaffe operations are less well covered, such as the air resupply of the Demyansk pocket, cut off by the Soviet winter counteroffensive. This German success led to overconfidence in their airlift capabilities that was later to prove fatal at Stalingrad.-

On the Soviet side, the book only briefly touches on the development of Moscow's air defenses. Some 500 single-seat fighters defended Moscow when the German bombing started, comparable in numbers with RAF's

Fighter Command during the Battle of Britain but not part of an integrated air defense system. Soviet attempts to improvise a response were hampered by the loss of experienced personnel in the purges and the Russo-Finnish war even before the devastating setbacks of summer 1941 and the difficulties of fighting under Stalin's personal gaze. *Taran* – ramming tactics – were publicized as exemplifying socialist self-sacrifice but were in reality a desperate improvisation reflecting limitations in Soviet fighters, lacking even unreliable weapons and radios and flown by minimally trained pilots. The authors frank discussion of the Soviets' limitations show these led to long-lasting distortions in the historical record; the archives of this period contain false and fabricated reports that served to preserve hard-pressed commanders against Stalin's wrath.

The uneven source material is reflected in a narrative that provides interesting – and telling – details but sometimes misses the larger picture (especially on the German side), such as weapons loads of individual bombers attacking Moscow. Bullet holes (wooden airplanes can be tough) were counted in one Soviet fighter that returned to base after it tangled with a German bomber. The authors identify this as a Heinkel He 111 of KGr 100, the Luftwaffe's pathfinders, down to a *staffel* in strength after the 1940-41 night bombing campaign over Britain.

The authors use their ability to focus on such details to describe lend-lease aircraft going into action with the Soviets: British-built Hurricanes and US-built P-40s. An I-153 biplane fighter shot down a Bf 109 flown by a Spanish Air Force volunteer pilot with a salvo of air-to-air rockets. The Sukhoi Su-2, an often-overlooked early-war *Shturmovik*, was appreciated for its air-cooled engine, less likely to freeze in sub-zero temperatures.

Such close-focus glances at the details of the campaign are interesting but overwhelm the narrative at times. The authors' ability to present the campaign this way is limited by major gaps in the records, such as they day when nine He 111s are recorded as failing to return, without any corresponding Soviet claims to having shot them down. At the level of matching individual air combat, losses and victory claims, being comprehensive is not a realistic objective, but the authors have been able to pull together enough for a worthwhile narrative that runs until April 1942, while the Soviets transitioned from desperate improvisation to starting their learning curve. The first P-39 Airacobras arrived from the US and would be successfully used by fighter units through the end of the war. Radars – both Soviet-built and lend-lease – were incorporated into the air defense of Moscow. Ground observer networks were expanded and linked.

The prewar three-fighter vee formations were replaced by flying in line abreast, stepped up for mutual support. The narrative captures all these events, but the slow and costly processes of operational and tactical evolution mainly took place outside the scope of this book. It was after new aircraft and new pilots went into action over Stalingrad in 1942 and the Kuban bridgehead in 1943 when the Germans started to feel the weight of Soviet airpower. The Luftwaffe's capabilities in the east, which appear at their height in this book, would decline, slowly and painfully, towards their final failure.

This book has no maps. Even a single map showing major cities, airbases and the location of the front lines at key dates of the campaign would have been useful. The illustrations are black and white photographs, mostly from the Soviet sources, including some unlikely to be familiar to western readers.

While not a definitive account, this book is a detailed operational narrative of air combat at a decisive time on the eastern front and, secondarily, provides worthwhile insights on how both Soviet and German air arms adapted in combat at a time when both were stumbling. For those interested in Second World War air operations, it is worth having.

Air Battle for Moscow, 1941-1942, by Dmitry Degtev and Dmitry Zubov. Warwick.: Air World / Philadelphia: Pen & Sword, 2021. Pp. viii, 238. Illus., tables, biblio., index. \$34.95, ISBN, 978-1-5267-7446-0; ; e- editions. –David C. Isby

***Gettysburg 1963:
 Civil Rights, Cold War Politics,
 and Historical Memory
 in America's Most Famous Small Town,***
 by Jill Oglie Titus

In 1963, the 100th anniversary of the battle of Gettysburg was celebrated, but there were many had different ideas as to how to present its significance to the Civil War, and to connect it to the Cold War and African American civil rights. Many drew on Lincoln's Gettysburg Address to consider the messages of unity, freedom -- both domestically and globally, and self-determination. For many, reconciliation was but a word when injustice and inequality remained in the U.S., including Gettysburg itself. Dr. Titus, Associate Director of Civil War Institute Civil War Institute at Gettysburg College, examines how the 1963 centennial influenced political, social, and local civic changes and how the commemoration influenced improvements in the Gettysburg National Military Park, and how differing views of the battle and its meaning enabled the country to better understand its past and how the future would change in unexpected ways.

Gettysburg 1863 looks at how the slavery and the U.S. Colored Troops helped bring about Union victory, and how this influence was downgraded in the post war era, with the coming of Jim Crow, extending through – and beyond – the Centennial; ceremonies marking the 100th anniversary of the firing upon Fort Sumter took place in a segregated Charleston, with African Americans barred from hotels and restaurant, and left out of the observances. Titus notes that although African American leaders and many liberals urged President John F. Kennedy to press for broader participation, this event and many others commemorating the war, failed, but did help lead to greater progress later, including changes in the ways in which Gettysburg and other National Military Parks presented the war.

Titus does an extraordinary job of explaining how the different local organizations involved in the Gettysburg centennial -- the Pennsylvania Gettysburg Centennial Commission, the Adams County Civil War Centennial Commission, veterans' descendants groups, etc. – use the events to inspire a sense of patriotism in the many visitors. She notes that the three principal storylines of these groups were:

- To promote a “States’ Rights” interpretation of the conflict;
- To relate the fallen soldiers to the need for racial justice in the 1960’s; and
- To help the U.S. efforts during the Cold War to spread democracy, capitalism, and modern technology throughout the world.

Finally, Titus, demonstrates that, ironically, many of the observances curiously connect the anti-fascist message of the 1930’s and 1940’s with the Cold War message of anti-communism into a sweeping celebration of the Confederate cause on the Gettysburg battlefield.

Titus also makes some interesting observations on how various politicians – then Vice President Lyndon Johnson, former President Dwight Eisenhower, and Alabama Governor George Wallace – chose to interpret Gettysburg in different ways. Johnson remarks followed Martin Luther King’s “Letter from Birmingham City Jail” that white pleas for Black Americans to exercise patience was wrong and needed to change, while Eisenhower – who had a rather positive record on Civil Rights – failed to address the question of American racism, to call for Americans to be self-reliant, while white segregationist Wallace used Gettysburg to defend traditional Southern beliefs in the “Lost Cause” and racial separation. She shows how Gettysburg was used by right-wing groups and President Donald Trump in the defense of Confederate symbols and monuments. Finally,

Titus notes how 2020 Democratic Presidential candidate Joe Biden repeatedly spoke in an Abraham Lincoln style, portraying the United States as in a battle for the soul of the nation and had a vision of a more equal future for people of color. Like the roads that led the armies to Gettysburg in 1863, 2020 brought Gettysburg to center stage in the modern era.

Titus hits a home run with *Gettysburg 1963*, which is highly recommended for the buff or the serious student of memory, the battle, and the modern importance of this small town just north of the Mason-Dixon line.

Gettysburg 1963: Civil Rights, Cold War Politics, and Historical Memory in America's Most Famous Small Town, by Jill Oglino Titus. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2021. Pp. xiv, 250+. Illus., notes, biblio., index. \$27.95 paper, ISBN: 978-1-4696-6534-4; hard back and e-editions available/ – David Marshal

Romulus:

***The Legend of Rome's Founding Father*,**
 by Marc Hyden

The mythic origins of Rome are among the great curiosities of history. Centering on the twins Romulus and Remus, rather than a tale of noble warriors and heroic deeds, we get infanticide, rape, fratricide, kidnapping, murder, and other abominations, about which the Romans seem to have been rather embarrassed. In his newest book, Marc Hyden, author of *Gaius Marius: The Rise and Fall of Rome's Saviour*, delves deeply into the available evidence on the origins of Rome and its founder, from the 60-some contradictory ancient accounts, many fragmentary, and the archaeological record, added a bit of comparative history, and produced a “biography”—or perhaps better – a “life and times” of Romulus.

While Hyden notes that Romulus may have been an invented figure – the name can mean “the Roman” or even “the Little Roman” – he may well have been a real person about whom fabulous tales accumulated (Washington and cherry tree come to mind), which he tends to favor, as does this reviewer.

Hyden's treatment is chronological. He begins with Aeneas fleeing dying Troy, a link almost certainly fabricated to give Rome a tie to the Greek epic. There follows the birth of the twins Romulus and Remus to the Vestal Rhea Sylvia, the founding of the city, the murder of Remus, the Rape of the Sabine Women, and more. He covers Romulus as ruler and warrior, his supposed institution of many of Rome's often unique religious and social institutions. Nor does he stop with Romulus' the “apotheosis” – or more likely murder – but goes on to consider

the influence of the tale of Romulus on the later history of Rome.

By being critical of the available evidence, Hyden rather effectively sorts among the “fact, fiction, or somewhat in between” of Rome's founder to give us an interesting, entertaining, and often thought provoking look at Rome's origins, suggesting ways to interpret similar myths from other cultures. Valuable for those interested in Roman history or myths and legends.

Romulus: The Legend of Rome's Founding Father, by Marc Hyden. Barnsley, Eng.: Pen & Sword / Philadelphia: Casemate, 2020. Pp. x, 284. Illus., maps, notes, biblio., index. \$34.95, ISBN 978-1-5267-7831-2; e-editions. –A. A. Nofi

***No Common Ground:
 Confederate Monuments and the
 Ongoing Fight for Racial Justice*,**
 by Karen L. Cox

The author of the award winning *Dixie's Daughters*, in *No Common Ground*, Prof. Cox (North Carolina) gives us a detailed, interesting account of the history of Civil War monuments from the postwar period through the era of Jim Crow and on into the 21st Century.

Cox looks at how the rise of the “Lost Cause” ideology influences monuments and memorials across several distinct periods, the 1880's -1900, the post-world war era, the 1950's-1960's and on to 2020. She concludes that in all periods racism, white supremacy, and the Lost Cause myth were common to the narrative presents by these monuments. Groups such as the United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC), provided white Southerners with reasons to take pride in their heritage and the motives of their ancestors in fighting the Civil War, for the defense of their beliefs and traditions, while ignoring racism and slavery.

Cox argues that the importance of Confederate monuments is not limited to the groups which erected them or to those who espouse the “Lost Cause”, representing “Southern heritage”. She makes the case that the monuments were also – perhaps primarily – intended to emphasize to African Americans that they were second-class citizens throughout the Jim Crow era, while promoting white supremacy, preventing black suffrage, and promoting a “state's rights” agenda in opposition possible Federal efforts to secure Black civil rights, even to condoning continuing racial violence. Cox notes that the influence of the UDC continues to the present.

Cox raises important questions that many Americans find difficult to cope with, such as the many protests and demonstrations beginning in 2020, in part sparked by the death of George

Floyd, have raised awareness of the extent and purpose of Confederate memorialization.

that have at times led to the defacement or violent demolition of monuments, the many communities that have removed monuments, and the many state governments contemplating legislation to determine what happens to such monuments. She reminds us that there are Confederate monuments in virtually every state, including those never a party to Secession.

Cox has provided a thought-provoking, rich, compelling, and well-timed look at a very timely public debate.

No Common Ground: Confederate Monuments and the Ongoing Fight for Racial Justice, by Karen L. Cox. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2021. Pp. xii, 206+. \$24.00, ISBN 978-1-4696-6267-1; audio- and e-editions.

--David Marshall

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Review Essay,
The Spanish and Portuguese in
the Peninsular War

In the history of the Peninsular War (1808-1814), especially when it comes to English-language sources, there always has been a bias towards the stories of the British and French armies. This is despite the fact that the contributions of the armies of Spain and Portugal were just as important to ultimate outcome of the war as the actions of those of the Duke of Wellington or Napoleon, which that receive so much more attention. Two recent books serve to shed light on these lacunae, revealing many details that have been excluded from the existing histories. Both works add significantly to the existing literature on the war

In the Words of Wellington's Fighting Cocks, 1812-1814, by Moises Gaudencio and Robert Burnham, marks the first time that the after-action reports of the Portuguese regiments of Wellington's army have been translated into English. These reports are supplemented by detailed return tables of the casualties suffered in the various actions and battles by the same Portuguese units. Bringing these documents together provides a fascinating narrative of several famous battles from Salamanca to Toulouse.

Introductory chapters cover the organization and recruitment of Portuguese units, and their integration into Wellington's army. One is able to see how the system of awards and promotion worked within the Anglo-Portuguese army as the

after-action reports include acknowledgements of the heroism of individual soldiers, reports of the death and wounding of officers, and requests for promotion. British officers were incorporated into Wellington's Portuguese regiments at all levels, so it is interesting to follow the paths of particular British and Portuguese officers, as well as the balance between Portuguese and British officers within each regiment over time.

These accounts sometimes contradict better-known French and British sources that have codified into the agreed-upon narrative of the Peninsular War. The casualty reports attest to the courage and contribution of the Portuguese forces to Wellington's victory in the Peninsula, as they made up around a third of Wellington's troops by the end of the war. Each of his infantry divisions, excepting the 1st, included Portuguese troops. Some of the smaller actions of the war that are usually passed over by historians come to life in this book through the after-action reports provided. *In the Words of Wellington's Fighting Cocks* is an excellent source for Peninsular War aficionados, and it is to be hoped that a second volume covering the period 1808-1811 will be forthcoming.

On the other hand, *Napoleon's Stolen Army* covers the famous case of the Spanish division of the Marquis de La Romana, which in August of 1808 escaped from Denmark with the help of the Royal Navy to join the struggle in the Peninsula. The story of how the army was evacuated from Zealand has not been told in such detail before, and the work covers the subsequent operations of what La Romana's troops in the war.

Several chapters cover what happened to the remnants of the division that could not escape and were captured by the French in Denmark. They were used to form the French *Regiment Joseph-Napoleon*, that marched all the way to Moscow in 1812. Marsden was able to find two soldiers' accounts from the regiment, that tell of the regiment's role at Borodino and in the retreat from Moscow.

In the Words of Wellington's Fighting Cocks: the after-action reports of the Portuguese army during the Peninsular War, 1812-1814, by Moises Gaudencio and Robert Burnham. Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2021; maps, illustrations, tables, index, endnotes, bibliography, 352 pages.

Napoleon's Stolen Army: How the Royal Navy Rescued a Spanish army in the Baltic by John Marsden; Warwick, England: Helion & Company Limited, 2021; maps, illustrations, tables, footnotes, bibliography, index.

-- Alex Stavropoulos

The NYMAS Tentative Fall 2022 Schedule.

The final program will be available in the July-August newsletter, and on the NYMAS websites, www.nymas.org and www.nymas2.org. Unless otherwise indicated, programs begin at 7:00 p.m. on Fridays and last about 90 minutes.

Due to the continuing disruptive effects the COVID pandemic and the need to secure an appropriate venue, the program will be primary via Zoom, but some special events combining Zoom and a limited live audience are in planning. Sign on information will be available prior to each talk in the July-August newsletter and on the Symposium’s websites.

- Sep. 9 “Rome: An Empire”, Prof. Greg Woolf, U.C.L.A., author of *Rome: An Empire's Story*
- Sep. 16 “A Great and Rising Nation: Naval Exploration in the Early U.S. Republic”, Prof. Michael A. Verney, Drury University, author of *A Great and Rising Nation: Naval Exploration in the Early U.S. Republic*,
- Sep. 21 **Wednesday @ 7:00 p.m.** “Victory at Sea”, Prof. Paul Kennedy, Yale University, author of *Victory at Sea* and *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*.
- Sep. 28 “Chester W. Nimitz”, Trent Hone, independent scholar and author of *Mastering the Art of Command: Admiral Chester W. Nimitz and Victory in the Pacific*
- Oct. 12 “Hellenistic Pike-Phalanx at War”, Prof. Christopher Matthew, Australian Catholic University, author of, *A Storm of Spears: Understanding the Greek Hoplite in Action*
- Oct. 19 “War in Ukraine”, Prof. Robert Hamilton, U.S. Army War College
- Oct. 26 “The Battle of Actium”, Prof. Barry Strauss, Cornell University, author of *The War That Made the Roman Empire: Antony, Cleopatra, and Octavian at Actium*
- Nov. 11 “Firepower: How Weapons Shaped Warfare”, Prof. Paul Lockhart, Wright State, author of *Firepower: How Weapons Shaped Warfare*
- Dec. 9 “Mystery of the Mandates : Truk, the Imperial Navy, and the United States”, Dr. John Prados, author of *Combined Fleet Decoded* and *Storm Over Leyte*.

Talks are sponsored by the New York Military Affairs Symposium, occasionally in conjunction with other scholarly or civic organizations. NYMAS is associated with the Society for Military History, Region 2. NYMAS talks are free and open to the public.

The current schedule may also be found on the [NYMAS](http://www.nymas.org) website

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Items for *The Review* should be sent to anofi@nymas.org.

Membership dues, deductible from both Federal and NY State taxes, are \$35.00 a year, payable in September. Checks should be made payable to “NYMAS” and mailed to the above address accompanied by the application below. You may also go online to join by credit card or PayPal at [Join NYMAS](http://JoinNYMAS).

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